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1. Introduction
Recently, there are many cases that malware bots damage our own computers. Skilled
botmasters are using elaborating tricks and hiding skills regarding to botnet activities. For this
research, I have found bots that control infected systems, through SSL communication. These bots are
generally communicating servers with encrypted SSL communication and it makes very hard to
monitor bots’ activities with packets. The communication port that I have found was not using the
IRC port. The bot I was working on was one of the Phatbots. Analyzing the botnet’s Command and
Control (C&C) server, I found its IP addresses. Then I analyzed the system and the files that were
infected. I had encrypted communication to control the infected system. I installed a Rootkit and
unreal Internet Relay Chat daemon (IRCd). When an infected system tried to communicate with C&C
server, the communication was encrypted to avoid a catch-up. I used an Internet Explorer to connect
to the server with TCP/436 port. To confirm SSL communication, I used https protocol. The botnet
C&C server was listening TCP/436 server. Then, I have used IRC client to connect the botnet C&C
server. The C&C server was communicating with 168 bit SSL. I accessed a specific channel that the
botmaster already set up and performed additional commands ordered by the botmaster. After the
infected system was connected to the botnet’s C&C server, it communicated with a specific channel to
install spyware, adware, and more. To follow the commands that botmaster had ordered, I downloaded
those wares to install in the infected system. Some specific bots infect others without connecting C&C
server. However, most of them have to connect to C&C server to communicate with the botmaster.
After monitoring the botnet’s C&C server for several days, the botmaster keeps trying to infect others
as follows.
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Generally, botmasters command their orders to infected systems with channel topic. Above statement
shows how the botmasters are using to attack some TCPs. A set-up file contained port numbers and
admin passwords for infected system to use. The botnet C&C server was set by a server password not
to be detected easily. Other than the port TCP/436, the server was using other ports too. I have used
unreal IRCd for botnet C&C program. The botmaster have changed source code to be controlled only
by itself. Also, it had blocked some specific IPs or domains to protect its own botnet C&C server. The
botmaster seems to know how to avoid some networks or how to attack the other networks as the
following a few statements show. These lines kill IRC connection on some specific domains or IPs.
M: 41.2.142.*:akilled:*
M:*.xxxx.com:akilled:*
M:*.gov:akilled:*
2. Method
Before my analysis, the number of infected systems by the bots through C&C server was
over 300. I found some IPs to extract bot binary files. However, after I closed the server, over 1000
systems were infected. Most of worms, viruses, and bots are compressed, before they are spread, to
reduce their sizes not to be detected or be analyzed easily. Some are even unable to decompress (e.g.,
Morphine). I have tried to vaccinate but no vaccines found malwares. The infected system’s OS was
Windows XP and the file was located on system32 folder. It has changed the system’s registry and set
on start-up menu. Then, how do bots follow commands after connected through C&C server? Some
specific channel topics have scan.startall and then the system follows the command. Then, they start
to have scanning attacks on some specific ports to spread bots using a weaker point that Windows OS
has. Followings are few botnet codes for scanning.
MOV EAX.DWORD PTR DS:[XXX]
LEA ECX.DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]

CALL [xxxx], XXXXXXX
PUSH ESI
PUSH EBX
,,,
Nowadays, bots are adding some more codes to be disassembled by detectors. If bots detect antidebugging tools like Softice or OllyDbg [4][5], they terminate their programs right away. The
following line is one of the codes to do that.
MOVX EAX, BYTE PTR[EAX+0X2]
Likewise, source codes for Phatbot keep updating their codes whenever they found some weaker
points [5]. Also, some bots are calculating TCP/IP checksum in assembler to gain speed [1][2].
Botmasters insert SSL methods to encrypt their commands not to be monitored easily by network
monitoring. The following lines are few codes for encrypting.
PUSH EAX
CALL xxxx
PUSH xxxy
PUSH 0001. . .
ADD ESP, xx . . . MOV EAX, 1 . . . RETN, NOP, NOP, NOP …
By network monitoring, I have tried to capture a communication which was encrypted with SSL.
However, I could not make decoding due to the encryption. To capture those communications, I need
to study a sniffing method for future works [1]. Currently, most bots are not activated on VMWare
because botmasters know that many honeypot methods are using VMWare to capture them and not to
be analyzed. The following code is an example to avoid VMWare [4].
Int IsVMWarePresent() {
int version = Version();
if(version| return ture; else return false;}
3. Results
To detect bots and botnet C&C server, I need an intrusion detection tool or software to monitor
network packets. Table 1 shows the ports that Bots used for the C&C server.
3267
8029

Port numbers
4141
5662
6666
7000
8249
9136
9998
31031
Table 1. Normal ports that Botnet C&C server usually used

Nowadays, instead of those ports listed in Table 1, botmasters are using randomly selected ports to
avoid conflicts with detectors [3]. The method that I used was somewhat successful and I could move
forward. To detect botnet C&C server, I need to know the ports for which botnet C&C servers use
frequently. Even though there are many unorganized ports, I need to get more information about
suspicious ports. Bots are more evolving and they will try more enough not to be found. This research
was not fully done for every botnet activities but I will keep trying to work on the most recent
important threats.
4. Conclusion
There is a saying “You can always win when you know your enemy and you.” This research
will be the first actual movement to advance my educational and career objective. Moreover, the
knowledge I obtained from this research could produce my future security works. In order to get rid of
those malicious botnets which control networks to harm our systems, we need to develop knowledge

about them first. Even though I encountered the shortage of botnet resources, I could get some
knowledge of the methods for enumerating bot-infected hosts and accurate assessment using entropybased measurement and research about the servers that the botnet uses to command and to control. We
can see botmasters are very intelligent to avoid our detection mechanisms. Therefore, we need
security consciousness for everybody. There are already many botnet take-down methods out there.
The IRC-based C&C is well spread and the most usages of hackers; however, hackers are also
evolving to avoid their weaknesses by moving their bases to HTTP or P2P [2]. Also, as the mobile
market grows so fast, we now need to focus on not only one specific but also every electric device. As
we can see the malwares or bots in spam could harm mobile phones, the detection mechanism for
spam over mobile phones could also be the problems in near future. The mechanism that I mentioned
and researched here has not fully implemented, but I will keep making research and find out what is
going on for the botnet world. The thing is that the nuclear weapon in the world is not a good thing
because it kills people. However, if we develop our botnet nuclear bombs to get rid of those botnets, it
will be the most successive invention, and it will cause people to live peaceful Internet lives. Now, let
us find mitigation and take-down methods against advanced botnet architecture in the computer world
studying botnet C&C, every electric device connected over network and others that have been evolved.
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